Abstract: This paper examines the design of a federal regulatory structure for insurance companies in the United States, assuming some form of an optional federal charter is adopted. Any design must take account of the objectives of insurance regulation, the convergence of financial service powers among banks, securities, and insurance firms, the types of lines to be regulated at the federal level, and problems posed by the possible participation of nationally chartered insurers in state residual pools and guaranty funds. This paper argues that the creation of a new federal insurance regulator should be accompanied by more consolidation and less fragmentation in the overall federal regulatory structure, by placing the new regulator within an operationally strengthened President's Working Group on Financial Markets.
licenses to insurers, and to regulate exclusively their operations and solvency. 10 The
Commissioner would have the power to implement the NIA by regulation, and would "have exclusive authority to determine whether a person subject to this Act has complied with the Act or the application of any State law to matters regulated under this Act, including the determination of any complaint raised by any person." 11 Thus, the NIA apparently would provide national insurers with "visitorial protection" analogous to that granted to national banks.
Like the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of National
Insurance would be self-funding. The NIA provides that the Office would be funded by the examination fees paid by national insurers and agents, as well as "such additional fees as the Commissioner determines to be necessary and appropriate to fund the expenses of the Office."
12
The NIA would eliminate prior approval of policy form and rate regulation for nationally licensed lines of life and property/casualty insurance. It would establish a "file and use" system for life insurance forms, and allow national life insurers to classify policyholders and set rates freely. 13 National property/casualty insurers would be subject to a "use and file" system, and be free from any requirement by the Commissioner that they use "any particular rate, rating element, price, or form."
14 National insurers still would be required to comply with state law prescribing compulsory coverage requirements for workers' compensation and individual auto 10 NIA, § 2(3). 11 NIA, § 1102(b)(1)(A)(iv) & (b)(2)(A). 12 Id., § 1122. 13 Id., § 1213. 14 Id., § 1214.
insurance, 15 and to participate in state mandatory residual risk mechanisms and guaranty funds. 16 However, under the Act, no state would be empowered to regulate the rates at which a national insurer might offer workers' compensation or auto insurance, or to require a national insurer to participate in any residual risk mechanism that would "fail to cover the expected value of all future costs" associated with it. 17 Also, the Commissioner would have to certify that each state guaranty fund fairly represents insurers by size and product line, and does not discriminate against national insurers.
18 If the state guaranty fund did not qualify for certification, a national insurer operating in that state would join the National Insurance Guaranty Corporation established by the NIA instead. 19 Internally, the Office of National Insurance would contain a Division of Insurance
Fraud, a Division of Consumer Affairs, and an Office of the Ombudsman. The Division of Insurance Fraud would be charged with investigating fraudulent insurance acts and enforcing civil penalties for violations of the law. 20 The Division of Consumer Affairs would implement and enforce market conduct regulations. 21 The Office of the Ombudsman would act as a liaison between the Office of National Insurance "and any person adversely affected by the Office's supervisory or regulatory activities, including the failure of the Office to take a requested action." 22 In addition, the Commissioner would have the authority to provide for the registration of a national insurance selfregulatory organization. 23 5
Objectives of Insurance Regulation
The business of insurance is "affected with a public interest." 24 For this reason, insurance companies and agents in the U.S. have been regulated since the colonial period. 25 Generally, state regulation has had two critical concerns: financial solvency and consumer protection. First, because insurance companies promise to provide insured persons or their beneficiaries with future benefits, regulators seek to ensure their stability and financial soundness. Second, because most insurance policy holders generally are unfamiliar with insurance contracts and lack complete information about insurance products, regulators seek to insure that policy holders receive fair and equitable treatment. Both rationales come down to consumer protection because, unlike banks, insurance company failures do not raise concerns about systemic risk.
A central part of insurance regulation is the enforcement of laws mandating insurance coverage and prohibiting "excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory"
rates. 26 The central purpose of rate regulation long has been the protection of consumers against prices "formed in the councils of the underwriters [and] promulgated in schedules of practically controlling constancy which the applicant for insurance is powerless to oppose." 27 Similarly, the perceived quasi-public character of insurance has led to the creation of residual market mechanisms like assigned risk pools. 28 The perceived 24 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389, 406 (1913) . 25 Colonial insurance companies were chartered under the British Crown. In 1792, Pennsylvania became the first state to charter insurance companies, and the several states soon followed suit. "monopolistic character" 29 of the business of insurance has been used by regulators to justify prior approval or review of product design and pricing, as well as the pooling of insureds.
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Rationale for Optional Federal Chartering
The debate over optional federal chartering of insurance has elucidated a number of goals and concerns that may serve as guideposts for a designer of a federal insurance regulator. The "dos" and "don'ts" of federal insurance regulation can provide a rubric for evaluating the different options for structuring the regulator.
First, the federal regulator should decrease costs of regulation by ensuring uniformity and achieving economies of scale. One of the rationales for a federal option is the avoidance of different compliance requirements imposed by each of the fifty-one state regulators. In order to realize this benefit fully, not only must federal regulation of federally chartered insurers preempt most state regulation, but it should also be sufficiently centralized at the federal level that insurers do not face overlapping obligations from different federal regulators. If a federal regulator is to achieve reduction in regulatory redistribution, it should be insulated from the incentives that lead to such regulation. The national scope of federal regulation itself is likely to reduce some of these incentives, such as pressure to 31 Harrington, Federal Chartering of Insurance Companies, supra note 9, at 6-7. 32 Id., at 14. 33 Id., at 15.
cross-subsidize groups within states. On the other hand, pressures could increase at the federal level to cross-subsidize groups among states. Generally, these pressures would be decreased by insulating a regulator from political pressure through the creation of an independent agency; however, this approach raises problems of its own, explored below.
Third, the federal regulator should establish an even playing field with other regulated financial institutions, like banks, securities firms, and foreign insurance firms.
Due to the multiple compliance costs and arguably excessive regulation of the present system, banks, securities firms, and foreign insurance companies, have a competitive advantage. After the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, banks began to compete directly with insurance companies in offering insurance products, leading insurance companies to complain that they were at a "severe competitive disadvantage" because banks face less burdensome regulation with a "vastly shorter timetable" for new product approvals. 34 A federal regulator should be sensitive to these competitiveness concerns and, where possible, coordinate its activities with those of other regulators to ensure a level playing field. A federal regulator cannot achieve an even playing field objective if it is dominated by concerns about one kind of firm. This suggests treating with caution a merger between the OCC and a new federal insurance regulator, or at least designing any merger to minimize the favoritism problem.
On the international front, U.S. insurance companies face difficulties in entering foreign markets, whose regulators may not be satisfied that supervision by state regulators is sufficient or may block entry to their markets in retaliation against the burdensome U.S. 
External Organization
With these considerations in mind, we turn to options for how to design a federal insurance regulator to fit within the federal regulatory structure. Certain key issues must be considered. State insurance departments may be funded from a variety of sources, including premium taxes, fees and assessments, appropriations, and penalties. 41 There is considerable diversity among the several states. In California, the Department of Insurance collects fees for licensing and examination of insurance companies and agents, and deposits them into a dedicated fund; fines and penalties are deposited into the state's general fund. In Maine, the Bureau of Insurance gathers operating revenue by making an annual assessment against all licensed insurers in proportion to each company's direct gross premium. In Nevada, the legislature appropriates monies for the Department of
Insurance from the general fund. The most common approach gives the state insurance department considerable freedom to collect fees for service, allowing for a degree of independence and self-funding.
Conclusions About the External Structure of a Federal Insurance Regulator
Some characteristics of state regulation are so prevalent that they may seem to be presumptively worthy of replication at the federal level. First, multimember insurance commissions are entirely absent among the states, which suggests that a Federal Reserve or SEC approach would not be appropriate at the federal level. However, state insurance regulators are often not independent from the political process, perhaps because some of the consumer issues they deal with are so highly political. Multimember setups may be 41 Brady, et al., THE REGULATION OF INSURANCE, supra note 25, at 89-91.
more appropriate for independent regulators, to assure that the independent agency has political balance-a substitute for more active political control. Second, the latitude given to state insurance departments in the setting and collecting of fees suggests that a national insurance regulator should be self-funding, at least in part. Self-funding would allow the regulator a degree of independence from the political process, akin to that enjoyed by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. However, the creation of another independent federal agency with its own wellspring of funds may not be a desirable result.
In my view, it would be a mistake to create an independent agency to regulate insurance, however one decides what insurance lines may be optionally regulated at the federal level. This would further fragment federal regulation, a step in the wrong direction. However, it would also not be wise to merge the insurance and banking regulators because banking considerations are likely to be dominant, given our history and the public concern with systemic risk. Insurance would be a poor step child. 42 The best approach would be to create a separate insurance regulator but use that occasion to strengthen the operational powers and resources of the President's Working Group on Internal Structure
The internal structure of the federal chartering agency must be determined in large part by the lines of insurance to be governed by a federal charter. This section considers the issues posed for the internal structure of the federal chartering agency by three lines of insurance: life, and two lines of property and casualty insurance, individual passenger automobile ("auto"), and commercial general liability ("commercial").
No state has a distinct set of rules for each insurance line, nor would such regulatory tailoring be sensible given the existence of common issues across lines and the fact that few remaining insurers are "monoline" companies. The fact that multiline insurers currently face common regulation of lines in the states strongly suggests that an optional federal chartering system that splits regulation of lines between the federal government and the states will increase the cost of regulation rather than decreasing it. 43 Brown, E Pluribus Unum -Out of Many, One, supra note 40, at 38-46. 44 Id., at 50-52. 45 Id., at 59. 46 Id., at 94-96. 47 Id., at 97.
To avoid this result, a federal option should provide that insurance firms have the choice of being regulated at the federal level for solvency and other forms of regulation that do not vary by line. Even if state solvency regulation currently varies by line, e.g. requiring more capital for more risky insurance products, the federal government should still regulate all insurance products for solvency. Thus, even if product regulation for firms choosing a federal charter were to be split between the states and the federal government, all firm regulation would take place only at the state or federal level.
As Table I shows, state regulators have taken different approaches to the regulation of life, individual auto and commercial insurance. 
Life Insurance
Life insurance companies offer life insurance contracts and other financial products (e.g., annuities) to retail customers, businesses, and groups. The market for life insurance products is highly competitive, a situation enhanced by increasing competition from banking and securities products. As industry executives and observers note, this is not simply a matter of banks offering life insurance in the wake of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, but of a more fundamental convergence taking place in the financial services industry. Life insurance companies have been among those most interested in a federal chartering option.
Solvency Regulation. Life insurers are subject to solvency regulation in each of the states and territories in which they do business. Solvency regulation encompasses chartering and licensing, and involves periodic financial reporting and examination requirements. As a rule, an insurer must be chartered as either a life insurance company or a property/casualty company, and will be licensed to issue one or more lines within these broad categories. 48 In order to be chartered and licensed, insurers must meet minimum capital and surplus requirements, which vary by category and line. Considerable uniformity already has been imposed upon states' minimum capital and surplus requirements by their adoption of Risk Based Capital Model Acts promulgated by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).
However, a few states, including New York, have retained their own fixed minimum capital and surplus requirements. A multistate, multiline insurer generally must meet the greater of NAIC's minimum riskbased capital requirements or the minimum capital requirements of each state in which it is licensed to do business. 49 In addition to minimum capital requirements, states regulate market entry through "seasoning" 48 The separation between life and property/casualty insurers seems to be the historical legacy of "monoline" insurance regulation, which began with the New York legislature's 1849 decision to require each insurance company to issue only a single line. Unification of the regulation of rates and policy forms in a single federal regulator obviously would reduce compliance costs to life insurers; elimination of prior approval of rates and policy forms would be of further value, enabling life insurers to compete with banks and securities firms on a more even playing field. 54 Because the market for life insurance products is highly competitive, consumer protection should take the form of simple regulations regarding market conduct, along with obligations to inform retail consumers.
Conclusion.
Full optional federal chartering of life insurance, safety and soundness and product regulation seems to create more opportunities than challenges.
State product regulation of life insurance is mainly concerned with policy form issues,
given the competitive nature of pricing in this market. If the federal charter also encompassed the regulation of the solvency of property/casualty insurers (see discussion below), the federal regulator could consolidate its regulation of these two lines.
An important internal structure issue raised by the need to protect life insurance consumers is whether the consumer protection function should be separated from the solvency regulation function-i.e., into two separate Divisions, Other than fraud investigation, consumer protection issues are not implicated by commercial general liability insurance.
As with life insurance, full optional federal chartering of commercial insurance, safety and soundness and product regulation, seems to create a number of opportunities to reduce regulatory costs and enhance product market efficiency. Commercial insurance generally poses few consumer protection problems.
However, workers compensation insurance, which operates in a distinct market and regulatory environment, 58 may be offered by commercial general liability insurers in most states. 59 This raises a serious question for those who would limit federal chartering of insurance only to life and/or "commercial" insurance: 60 Will a national commercial insurer be limited to commercial general liability insurance alone? Such limited licensing would require a "full service" national commercial insurer to be simultaneously chartered in workers' compensation in each state in which it seeks to do business.
Auto Insurance
Property/casualty insurers also offer voluntary auto insurance to retail consumers in strictly regulated markets. Universal coverage often is mandated or encouraged by regulators, and is provided by 57 As noted above, the NIA would establish a "use and file" system for property/casualty insurers, and would prohibit the Commissioner from requiring property/casualty insurers to use "any particular rate, rating element, price, or form. 
Rate/Policy Form Regulation and Consumer Protection. Auto insurance
regulation touches all aspects of consumer protection, including rates and policy forms, market conduct, and consumer education and complaints. The consumer protection concern is stronger for auto than life in large part because auto insurance is mandatory for drivers, i.e. most people, whereas, life insurance is optional.
Generally, auto insurance rates and policy forms are strictly regulated; for example, Massachusetts sets uniform rates and rating classes for insurance companies, and requires prior approval of policy forms. However, rate and policy form regulation differs greatly between states. Even two "prior approval" states may impose different burdens upon insurers, depending upon the stringency and speed of review, as well as the use of such regulation to suppress rates. 61 State regulators are strict in enforcing market conduct regulation and swift in responding to consumer complaints. The variety of state rate and policy form regulation imposes considerable direct and indirect costs upon auto insurers and results in various cross-subsidies between consumers with different risk profiles. Even if a federal regulator required prior approval of rates and/or policy forms, regulatory costs would be lowered by the adoption of a uniform approach. However, because the market for voluntary auto insurance in most states is highly competitive, a federal regulator may choose to deregulate rates and/or policy forms. 62 Illinois has completely deregulated rates for voluntary auto insurance since 1971 (it still regulates insolvency, market conduct, etc.). Observers report that auto insurance is widely available and rates are competitive in Illinois; moreover, deregulation seems to have had no adverse effect upon loss ratios, the size of the uninsured and residual market, or insurer solvency. 63 Consumer protection in a deregulated rate environment may be buttressed by the elimination of the federal antitrust exemption for national insurers (to prevent rate collusion).
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Even in a competitive, rate deregulated national auto insurance market, the federal insurance regulator may desire to regulate market conduct for the protection of consumers. Such an initiative may require a distinct division of market conduct and consumer protection dedicated to retail policyholders and beneficiaries. The more lines that can be regulated at the federal level that raise such consumer concerns, the more justification there would be for a separate division.
Residual Risk Mechanism. In order to guarantee the availability of auto insurance, every state has a residual risk market or assigned risk pool for drivers unable to secure voluntary auto insurance. Auto insurers doing business in a state participate in its residual risk market on a pro rata basis. State workers compensation insurance generally has a similar mechanism. The NIA would not create a national residual 62 For all property casualty insurance, including auto insurance, the NIA would establish a "use and file" system, and would prohibit federal rate regulation. See, NIA § 1214. 63 Stephen P. If national auto insurers are required to participate in state residual risk markets, regulatory supervision will be divided between federal (solvency and consumer protection) and state (residual risk compliance). This may raise direct compliance costs to insurers, as well as indirect costs related to increased time to market for new products.
There are two other options: the creation of a national residual risk mechanism, or the preemption of state residual risk mechanisms without the creation of a new one (a very unlikely alternative, politically). Obviously, the existence of a national residual risk mechanism would require national administration of a regulatory function unique to this kind of insurance. But national pooling offers the advantage of spreading the costs of underwriting losses among all insurers on a national basis. solvency is a firm-based, rather than product-based, phenomenon, and given the trend toward convergence across product lines. As is equally clear, the major differences between lines arise in the area of consumer protective regulation. Neither life nor commercial insurance requires great market conduct regulation or examination, given the relative simplicity of these products and the competitiveness of the markets for them.
Conclusion. Auto insurance is distinct in two respects
The ultimate question then, is whether and how the whole or partial integration of auto (and other retail property/casualty) insurance may be effected. 
Guaranty Funds
The state guaranty fund system is an important facet of insurance regulation that has been a cause of concern for federal chartering. These funds are in place to compensate for the losses suffered by third parties and policyholders due to insurance company insolvency. Since insurance regulators are responsible for preventing this insolvency, guaranty funds may be framed as a sort of "product warranty" for the quality of regulation. 67 The general perception is that the administration of state guaranty funds has been one of the most effective components of state insurance regulation.
States, at the behest of insurance companies, began to create these funds starting in 1969, perhaps in response to pressure for federal regulation. assessments paid. As a result, some of the cost of insolvency losses is passed along to taxpayers, who must make up for any shortfall in taxation created by these offsets.
The two most often praised features of the state guaranty fund system are its approach to assessments and level of coverage. With the exception of New York, every state fills its guaranty fund on a post-assessment basis. That means that member insurance companies do not pay into a fund until around the end of the year, and only to the extent necessary to compensate for losses. This may be contrasted with funding on a pre-assessment basis, wherein companies would pay into the fund before losses are known, as is the case with the FDIC fund for banks. Recently, the New York state legislature has taken advantage of its state's pre-assessment fund by siphoning off the fund's resources for general spending. This suggests that any prefunding mechanism needs to be highly insulated from the political process.
Additionally, state guaranty funds generally have low coverage limits.
Commentators hail these limits as promoting efficient behavior by insurance companies.
Due to the low limits, companies have incentives to self-insure by controlling their risk of insolvency. These incentives tend to minimize losses. Were coverage limits to be higher, insurance companies might be more likely to engage in risky behavior, such as writing more high risk policies, due to moral hazard. These are the same issues encountered in setting the appropriate level of FDIC insurance for banks.
Owing to this positive appraisal of state guaranty funds, many commentators have adopted an approach along the lines of "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." Indeed, postassessment funding and low coverage limits suggest that state guaranty funds do not suffer from the same weaknesses of over-regulation and inefficiency that might justify more general reform of insurance regulation. 
Conclusion
There are several important issues to be considered in designing a regulatory structure for the optional federal chartering option for insurance. First and foremost, the objectives of insurance regulation and the rationale for optional federal chartering must guide regulatory design. Second, lessons learned from existing federal and state financial services regulators regarding the external structure of such an agency must be borne in mind. Chief among these lessons is the disjunction between the accelerating convergence of financial services and the current fragmentation of our regulatory system. Third, the choice of the lines of insurance to be governed by a federal charter should be considered in designing the internal structure of the federal agency; at the same time, the choice of lines itself must be driven by our objectives in offering a federal option. Finally, the participation of national insurers in state residual risk mechanisms and guaranty funds must be determined, with reference to both consumer protection and efficiency goals.
While the federal government should have primacy in the regulation of insurance, it would be a mistake to establish a wholly independent Office of National Insurance (as contemplated by the NIA), further fragmenting federal regulation of financial services.
Neither would it be wise to consolidate federal regulation of banking and insurance under a single agency (a point upon which both NAIC and multistate insurance companies agree). In my view, the optimal external structure would involve the establishment of a distinct insurance regulator subject to oversight by the President's Working Group on Financial Markets. This approach is most likely to provide the greatest benefits arising from optional federal chartering of insurance-cost savings from uniformity, economies of scale, and appropriate deregulation, along with the benefits of coordinated financial services regulation-at the lowest cost. It would also combine regulatory expertise and independence with strong political oversight and accountability. Finally, it might serve as a first step toward consolidated federal financial services regulation, beginning with the reconciliation of capital requirements and accounting standards for all financial services firms.
The federal regulator of insurance should provide a true federal "option": national insurers should be subject only to federal regulation of their solvency and product offerings, and should be able to offer many lines of insurance. A federal regulator would be well situated to set and enforce appropriate risk-based capital requirements for national insurers, based upon product line and other relevant risk factors. Indeed, a federal regulator could consider removing the traditional barrier between life and property/casualty insurers, particularly in the wake of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. The benefits of optional federal chartering of insurance would be maximized, and the potential for duplicative and conflicting regulation reduced, by allowing national insurers to offer as many lines of insurance as possible. Retaining state policy form regulation for national auto and workers' compensation insurance (as contemplated by the NIA) would reduce greatly the benefits of rate deregulation for these lines. Alternatively, limiting national property/casualty insurers to commercial insurance would require them to charter separate workers compensation companies in each state in order to provide "full service." If necessary, product regulation for firms choosing a federal charter could be split between the states and the federal government, with solvency regulation taking place only at the state or federal level; however, such an approach might merely add to the inefficiencies of the existing system.
Clearly, licensing national insurers to offer certain lines, such as auto insurance, would implicate important consumer protection issues. Generally speaking, regulation of insurers, like that of banks, should be prudential in approach, and effected through the examination process. However, the more "retail" lines offered by a national insurer, the more a federal regulator would be required to promulgate market conduct regulation, investigate consumer complaints, enforce penalties for violations, and provide for consumer education. If such lines are offered, the federal regulator should create a distinct division of market conduct and consumer protection dedicated to retail policyholders and beneficiaries.
Furthermore, the relationship of national insurers to state residual risk mechanisms and guaranty funds must be determined. The creation of a national residual risk mechanism and a national guaranty fund would require federal administration of regulatory functions unique to insurance, and historically the province of the states.
However, federal administration of these functions would enable national pooling of residual and insolvency risks, and would allow for regulatory innovations (e.g., riskbased premiums for the national guaranty fund). Indeed, either or both "pools" could be open to the participation of state chartered insurers, allowing them to enjoy any economies of scale provided by federal administration.
In summary, design of a regulatory structure for the optional federal chartering option for insurance should provide for strong and efficient federal regulation of what is a national and international financial service activity. Insofar as is possible, the federal option should give insurers the choice to be subject only to federal, rather than state, regulation and law enforcement. And, insofar as the convergence of financial services is accelerating, creation of a federal option should be a first step towards more complete consolidation of federal financial services regulation. Such a system would level the playing field both nationally and internationally, and provide consumers with the most efficient and transparent "options."
